Blog 10: Hitler and Ellul—Two of a Kind?

Sources:

Ellul, Jacques. “The Betrayal of the West.”  Sources of European History Since 1900. Ed. Marvin Perry, Matthew Berg, and James Krukones. Boston: Wadsworth, 2011. 492-496. Print.

Hitler, Adolf. “Mein Kampf.” Meridians: Sources in World History.  Ed. Ashlee Quosigk. New York: Pearson Learning Solutions, 2011. 97-102. Print.

Summary:

In “The Betrayal of the West,” Ellul discusses the importance of the West’s contribution to history and culture.  He claims that ideas such as freedom, the “rights of man”, the elimination of exploitation, and socialism, no matter where they are found in the world, originated in the West.  His main themes are the individual and freedom, which he calls “the goal and desire implicit in the history of all civilizations” and what “made the West what it is” (496).  “The West alone has defended the inalienable rights of the human person, the dignity of the individual, the man who is alone with everyone against him,” Ellul claims (493).  He then goes through the heritage of the West, beginning with the Jews, then the Greeks, and then the Romans.  He admits the failings of the West, but insists that the “certain number of values, movements, and orientations that no one else has provided” not be overlooked or discounted (495).  The final paragraph in the selection contains this statement: “the West… thus produced a type of human being that is unique in history: true western man… I am bound to say that I regard this type as superior to anything I have seen or known elsewhere” (496).

My Opinion:

When I read this selection, I was immediately struck with how similar it is to parts of “Mein Kampf” that we read earlier on.  This really surprised me because Ellul was a sociologist, an intellectual, while I do not consider Hitler to be an intellectual.  I am sure that Ellul would not condone Hitler’s application of these ideas, but the theories are remarkably alike. 

Compare some of these quotes:

“But if, starting today, all further Aryan influence upon Japan should stop, and supposing that Europe and America were to perish, then a further development of Japan’s present rise in science and technology could take place for a little while longer; but in the time of a few years the source would dry out, Japanese life would gain, but its culture would stiffen and fall back into the sleep out of which it was startled seven decades ago by the Aryan wave of culture” (Hitler, 99).

“I simply observe that the peoples of the world had abided in relative ignorance and [religious] repose until the encounter with the West set them on their journey.  Please, then, don’t deafen us with talk about the greatness of Chinese or Japanese civilization.  These civilizations existed indeed, but in a larval or embryonic state; they were approximations, essays.  The always related to only one sector of the human or social totality and tended to be static and immobile.  Because the West was motivated by the ideal of freedom and had discovered the individual, it alone launched society in its entirety on its present course” (Ellul, 495).

Ellul’s superiority of the Western man sounds a lot like Hitler’s superiority of the Aryan.  Hitler’s idea of the Aryan being a “culture-founder” is very similar to Ellul’s ideas such as: “The West turned the whole human project into a conscious, deliberate business” (494). 

My question is this: should Ellul’s ideas be discounted because of this similarity to Hitler? Is the reminiscence of something which is, granted, repugnant enough to condemn it?  Perhaps such a connection isn’t enough to entirely reject it, but I would say it at least makes it highly suspect.   

Blog 9: The Failure of Propaganda

Source: Bytwerk, Randall L. Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004. 155-169. Print.

Summary:

Before examining the failures of the propaganda systems of Nazi Germany and the GDR, Bytwerk discusses some of their successes.  “The primary success came in establishing the illusion, both at home and abroad, that National Socialism and Marxism-Leninism had a depth of support greater than they in fact had” (155-156).  The idea was to create an image of uniformity that was not, in fact, the case.  They had great goals that were easy to agree with, and propaganda provided a reason to ignore the parties’ failings.  Also, the propaganda provoked actions that imitated true belief. 

Bytwerk gives three reasons for the failure of totalitarian propaganda:

·         It is untruthful

·         It encourages hypocrisy

·         It is “in the biblical sense idolatrous, placing a human absolute in place of a divine absolute” (160)

He ends the book with a biblical metaphor: “the great dictatorships of the twentieth century … built houses upon sand that could not resist the storm” (169).  The illusion of a unanimous support system was not enough because it was not real, and when the storm came, it vanished.

My Opinion:

On page 164, Bytwerk makes an interesting comment: “Whereas religions tend to integrate belief and action, totalitarian systems tend to disintegrate people’s thoughts and actions, no matter how much propaganda is poured into them.”  Earlier he quotes Ellul, saying, “The aim of modern propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but to provoke action” (159).  Bytwerk adds, “Actions change attitudes at least as much as attitudes change actions.  Propaganda builds habits of belief and expression.”  Were the propagandas of Nazi and East Germany misdirected?  Should they have promoted ideas rather than action? Or are “habits” and “actions” more important than “ideas” and “attitudes”?  The disintegration of thoughts and actions is an important concept.  If you want to have a fully convicted and engaged public, they must believe in the doctrine and then act on it.  Bytwerk gives the reason that totalitarian governments fail at this: “The fundamental problem is that the freedom to disbelieve is essential if one is to believe.  Both systems demanded belief,  and made it unpleasant to disbelieve, at least outwardly.  Citizens knew why they were doing what they were doing in public, and felt no pressure to internalize the demands of the system, to make them their own” (164).

What I really wondered while reading this chapter is, what is the role of propaganda?  It sounds like a two-edged sword: it can support a system, but can also weaken the system.  How do you utilize propaganda and public education without weakening your cause?  I think the idea that I just brought up in the preceding paragraph has something to do with it—you need to integrate belief and action, aiming to both modify ideas and promote action.  I think that we actually need more of this in our government today.  We need to be exposed to political ideas, and encouraged to believe in something.  In Texas, something like 2% of the voting population actually shows up for bond elections.  And those are the ones that have to do with our money! I think that if “propaganda” (of course we hate to call it that…) were aimed at getting us to believe in voting, instead of just begging us to do it, we might get more active participants.  I never would have thought that I would ask for propaganda, but I feel like we need to be more motivated by our government in order for the system to work better.  In a small way, I guess I now have something in common with Dr. Goebbels.  Scary.

Blog 8: The Wall

Source: GDR. “What You Should Know About the Wall.” Sources of European History Since 1900. Ed. Marvin Perry, Matthew Berg, and James Krukones. Boston: Wadsworth, 2011. 305-309. Print.

Summary:

This brochure was published by the GDR in English in 1962 for foreign distribution, explaining the wall and why it was necessary. It is divided into ten “considerations”, kind of a “Berlin Wall FAQ”.  These are the considerations:

1.       Where, exactly is Berlin situated?

2.       Did the wall fall out of the sky?

3.       Did the wall have to come?

4.       What did the wall prevent?

5.       Was peace really threatened?

6.       Who is walled in?

7.       Who breaks off human contacts?

8.       Does the wall threaten anyone?

9.       Who is aggravating the situation?

10.   Is the wall a gymnastic apparatus?

It ends with a plea to side with the GDR over the wall:

“Decide in favour of the recognition of realities.  Don’t join in the row over the wall.  Perhaps YOU don’t want socialism.  That is your affair.

“But should we not come to an agreement jointly to refrain from doing anything that leads to war and do everything that serves peace?” (309).

My Opinion:

The whole tone of the brochure is extremely defensive and a little angry.  It is not the tone I would have chosen for foreign propaganda because it would make an already skeptical audience further discount anything that is said.  When I hear a defensive-sounding argument I usually characterize the whole thing as desperate and lacking forethought before I even really hear them out.  Also, the government of the GDR basically accepts no responsibility for the wall, making it sound as though they had no choice but to build the wall and were almost forced into it by West Germany.  I don’t think anyone who read this brochure would have found this credible.

I found it very interesting that the prevention of war was the main reason behind the wall listed in this brochure.  The comment is made, “For the first time in German history the match which was to set fire to another war was extinguished before it had fulfilled its purpose” (308).   This is illuminating.  The GDR is trying to set themselves above all the rest of German history as alone having the courage to prevent war, especially in contrast to the Nazi regime which glorified war.

In the next section the authors quote an Indian journalist who clearly was supportive of the GDR’s propaganda: “It (the protective wall of the GDR) served the cause of world peace since it halted the advance of the German neo-Hitlerites toward the East, forced the world to recognize the reality of the division of Germany and thus supports negotiation” (308).  I don’t know very much about India’s relationship to the GDR, or why this journalist had to write such highly-propagandized material.  I can’t tell if he is calling all of West Germany “neo-Hitlerites” or is he referring to some specific groups?  It’s kind of funny to say that physically separating two groups supports negotiation, as negotiation is usually about bring people together and not keeping them apart.

Under the sixth consideration (“Who is walled in?”), it reads: “According to the exceedingly intelligent explanations of the West Berlin Senate we have walled ourselves in and are living in a concentration camp.”  In the next paragraph it talks about the armament of the GDR and then comments, “What do you think of a concentration camp whose inmates have weapons in their hands?” (308).  I don’t think that such heavy sarcasm was wise, especially since the West Berliners had a point.  The people behind the wall were trapped—they were being killed if they tried to escape!  Also, they are glossing over the real “inmates”—the average citizens, who were not armed, and did not have a choice in the matter.

Overall, I found this piece repugnant as it treated the readers with contempt and was overly propagandized.  I don’t think that this brochure would have served its purpose, as it did not get off its soap box long enough to make any resounding points.

Blog 7: Freedom and Myths

Source:

Cassirer, Ernst. “The Myth of the State.” Sources of European History Since 1900. Ed. Marvin Perry, Matthew Berg, and James Krukones. Boston: Wadsworth, 2011. 280-282. Print.

Summary:

Cassirer begins by announcing new theoretical problems, new questions with new answers, and, “most alarming”, a new power: the power of mythical thought, which seemed to have won a victory over rational thought in modern political systems.  He says that there is a “deep chasm between two different fields,” with the political following different rules than the theoretical, ignoring rational and scientific thought.  Cassirer comments that the myths of his day are not products of imagination, but “artificial things fabricated by very skillful and cunning artisans.” He compares these myths to manufactured modern weapons.

Cassirer then calls this new totalitarian experience a regression to “savage life,” referring to the people as “marionettes in a puppet show.”  He then discusses freedom, arguing that man’s natural instincts do not lead someone to strive for freedom.  Finally, he states that philosophy cannot destroy political myths, but it can help us understand them.  “In order to fight an enemy you must know him.”

My Opinion:

When Cassirer talks about the lack of rationality in the politics of his day (particularly Nazi Germany), it made me wonder about our politics today?  Are we led more by myth or rational thought?  In all honesty, I think I would have to lean more towards myth.  We don’t listen to speeches for content; we rely on sound bites and negative ads to make our decisions.  We don’t take the time to understand the system; we generally go along with what the government does because we don’t care to find out our options for helping change things.  We might complain about the actions of political leaders, but usually only after the media tells us we should complain.  So we are surrounded by two myths: the political myth, and the media myth.  Sometimes they work hand in hand, and sometimes they are at odds with one another, and we just get swept along with their opinions, never forming our own original political thoughts.

I’m going to put the following quote (even though it is a bit long) because it really struck me and caused me to think:

“Freedom is not a natural inheritance of man. In order to possess it we have to create it.  If man were to simply follow his natural instincts he would not strive for freedom; he would rather choose dependence.  Obviously it is much easier to depend upon others that to think, to judge, and to decide for himself.  That accounts for the fact that both in individual and in political life freedom is so often regarded much more as a burden than a privilege.  Under extremely difficult conditions man tries to cast off this burden.  Here the totalitarian state and the political myths step in.  The new political parties promise, at least, an escape from the dilemma.  They suppress and destroy the very sense of freedom: but at the same time, they relieve men from all personal responsibility.”

This quote made me wonder: how often do I look for freedom, and how often am I much more content with dependence?  I have been raised on rhetoric of the freedom of our country, and how blessed I am to be in it.  Certainly, especially compared to Nazi Germany, we do have a lot of freedoms in our country.  But do I take advantage of them?  Or do I depend on others to tell me what to do, because it is easier?  Even as I am writing this, a little part of me is thinking, “This is exhausting thinking about all this stuff.  It’s easier to just do what you’re told.”  That frightens me.  Would I be prepared to resist, and not just complain, if a really repressive government came into power here?

Blog 6: The Long-lasting Consequences of Foreign Policy

Source:

Hitler, Adolf. “Poland Will Be Depopulated and Settled With Germans.” Sources of European History Since 1900. Ed. Marvin Perry, Matthew Berg, and James Krukones. Boston: Wadsworth, 2011. 209-211. Print.

Summary:

This is a speech that Hitler gave to his generals on August 22, 1939.  In it, Hitler claims that “there are only three great statesmen in the world, Stalin, I and Mussolini” (210).  He calls Mussolini the weakest, and so he determines to “stretch out my hand to Stalin at the common German-Russian frontier and with him undertake to re-distribute the world.”  We know that the day after this speech the nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union was signed, which basically gave Hitler the go-ahead to invade Poland. 

Hitler’s speech makes the brutality of his plans blatantly obvious.  He says, “the goal to be obtained in the war [with Poland] is not that of reaching certain lines but of physically demolishing the opponent… Only thus can we gain the living space that we need.”  He then makes a very illuminating and poignant remark: “Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?”  Then, later, “The world believes only in success.”  His advice to his generals in their style of war is downright bloodthirsty: “Be hard, be without mercy, act more quickly and brutally than the others.  The citizens of Western Europe must tremble with horror.  That is the most human way of conducting a war.  For it scares the others off.”

My Opinion:

This speech makes very clear the long-lasting consequences of foreign policy.  Hitler had a very shrewd understanding of what the rest of Europe was (and wasn’t) prepared to do, and he exploited it in order to invade Poland with very little resistance.  Of course this officially started World War II, but the damage had already been done in Poland, and it would be some time before the Nazis could be slowed down. 

What I would like to focus on is Hitler’s comment, “Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?” and “The world believes only in success.”  Even today, people don’t really speak about what happened to the Armenians—I had only vaguely heard of it, and so I had to look it up in our book.  On pages 64-70 of Source of European History Since 1900, there is an account of “The Turkish Assault on Armenians”.  Basically it was genocide much like Hitler’s Final Solution conducted by the Turks during World War I.  Viewing the Armenians as subversive because of their “strong sense of identity—both as a distinct ethnic group and as a Christian religious community” (65).  The descriptions of Turkish methods bear strong resemblance to Hitler’s actions twenty years later.  Hitler was clearly influenced by this first genocide, and gained confidence from the fact that the Turks pretty much got away with it—again notice the comment that “the world believes only in success.” 

I believe that Europe’s lack of response to the Armenian’s plight directly led to Hitler’s confidence and brutality in Nazi Germany.  This begs the question—at what point should nations get involved in wars or atrocities that don’t involve them directly?  Is merely condemning them with words enough, or should force be exerted?  I think if enough nations come together, the show of strength may be enough to avoid war.  Hitler’s opinion of the Armenia situation shows that lack of action can be just as decisive as too much—it sets a dangerous precedent that can have massive repercussions later on.

We need to care about foreign policy.  Americans need to worry about what is going on in other nations.  With the world even more connected now than ever before, crimes against humanity shouldn’t be qualified by nationality—we should all be involved.  Those who talk about minding our own business should take care: today’s Armenia could be tomorrow’s World War III.